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After The Velvet Revolution in 1989, Czechoslovakia has proved that  “A Velvet
divorce” is also possible. At the end of 1992, the process of political disintegration resulted
in the split of the Czechoslovak Republic, and the Czech and Slovak Republics then started
their co-existence of two independent interdependent republics. The political dissolution
followed by  the disintegration of the two national economies highlighted the problem  of
designing the process of  monetary disintegration as one of the key issues in defining the
new Czech-Slovak relationship.
It was very  difficult to decide what should weigh more - whether the
interdependence of two republics built in the period of seventy  years of a common state or
the newly gained political  independence. On the one hand, the sudden monetary
disintegration was expected to be costly for two highly interdependent economies since it
would have replaced the common currency by two inconvertible currencies with similar
consequences to those of the CMEA collapse. On the other hand, maintaining of a currency
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union in the longer-term would have required very close  economic as well as  political
coordination that did not appear  to be  realistic for   a “just divorced couple”.
As described in the second section,  a middle course  was accepted  when designing
the monetary disintegration since two intermediate stages were implemented on the way
towards  a standard payment system in convertible currencies. The fate of the Czech-Slovak
currency union - the first stage of disintegration -  is described with its unexpectedly short-
lived existence. Subsequently, a brief history of  the Czech-Slovak  clearing payment union
implemented as the second intermediate stage is summarized together with the remaining
steps in order to reach the target system.  The third  section analyzes the costs and benefits
of monetary disintegration looking at the  Czech-Slovak experience in the first two years of
independence. The general costs and benefits of the disintegration process are  weighed as
well as  particular ones imposed by specific   features of the Czech-Slovak solution to the
monetary disintegration problem. In the  last section, it is concluded that  economic and
political constraints crucially affected the potential costs and benefits of monetary
disintegration in such a way that gradual monetary disintegration was superior to  a
currency union or a  sudden monetary disintegration.
2. The Czech-Slovak Monetary Disintegration
In 1992, the  Czech and Slovak  authorities declared  their desire to conduct
independent national monetary and exchange-rate policies as well as to take steps toward
full convertibility separately.  Consequently,  the  development of a standard payment
system between the Czech and Slovak Republics conducted in convertible  currencies
became a target in the area of monetary cooperation. The target  system  was not3
implemented immediately. The gradual approach was accepted in order to avoid a costly fall
in mutual trade   similar to the trade decline when the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA)  collapsed. The monetary disintegration of the former Czechoslovakia
was sequenced in two intermediate stages - currency union and payment clearing union.
In October 1992, the Monetary Arrangement was signed   between the Czech  and
Slovak Republics  establishing the Czech-Slovak currency union. The aims of the
arrangement were to ensure a stability of the Czechoslovak crown as a common currency
and to provide a framework for  further economic cooperation. The arrangement contained
four escape clauses any of which would allow for either  member to abandon the union. The
union could be abandoned if the deficit of one of the republic members  exceeded 10
percent of annual republic revenues; the fall in foreign reserves of one  of the central banks
exceeded the value of that month's import in convertible currencies; speculative capital
flows from one republic to the other  exceeded 5 percent of total bank deposits; the
Monetary council could not  agree on a common monetary policy. The  council was
established by the Czech National Bank (CNB) and the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS),
as successors of   the central bank of the former Czechoslovakia (SBCS),  in order to
negotiate common  monetary and  exchange-rate    policies as well as reserve requirements.
Although the arrangement  signaled a temporary life for the union, it was expected to
last for six months. However, the role of the Monetary council became   extremely difficult.
Not only  was the  union  burdened with  longer-term asymmetric economic problems but
also the external stability of common currency was eroded  by expectations of the monetary
dissolution rapidly. Large capital outflows hastened  the implementation of the second step
of  monetary disintegration (See Figure  1). The Czech and Slovak crowns were separated4
after six weeks and the currency  union was replaced by a payment clearing union  in
February 1993.














































































Note: The   fall of foreign reserves that began  in November 1992  was not stopped by the
split of Czechoslovakia as had been expected. Both central banks  faced a sharp fall in  reserves
during the time of the currency union and their total reserves were lower than one billion USD in
February.  Foreign commercial banks stopped quoting  the  Czechoslovak crown. After the
currency dissolution,  foreign reserves  recovered quite rapidly  in the Czech Republic.  It took
much longer for Slovak reserves to reach the pre-split level.
Data source: Financial Statistical Information (1992), SBCS. Monetary Indicators (1993), CNB.
At the beginning of  1995, this second intermediate stage of monetary disintegration
is still being  used. All payments between republics are regulated by the Payments
Agreement that recognizes three regimes of transactions. First, the majority of transactions
belongs to the clearing regime that defines the Czech and Slovak crowns as independent and
inconvertible currencies. It is available to all legal and physical persons  for their Czech-
Slovak transactions.  It is worth noting that transactions settled through clearing  are not5
restricted only to trade and service transactions. Transfer payments or capital account
transactions (such as purchases and sales of financial assets) belong to the clearing regime
as well.
These transactions are settled in domestic national currencies at a clearing exchange
rate derived from  the cross-exchange rate of the Czech and Slovak crowns vis-a-vis the
ECU. Central banks committed themselves to  maintaining the deviation of the clearing rate
from the cross-exchange rate with 5 percent bands1. It implies that the clearing mechanism
provides a relatively stable exchange rate between the two national currencies (given both
republics use nominal exchange rates as nominal anchors) since the exchange rate can be
altered  to a different level only if one of the currencies is revalued or devalued vis-a-vis the
ECU. Moreover, the  transactions from the period before February 1993 that were
denominated in  the Czechoslovak crown are settled through the “old clearing account” at
the  fixed exchange rate of  one to one.   The second regime defined by the Arrangement is
the “re-export” regime into which the re-sales of goods imported from the third countries
fall. These transactions can only be settled in convertible currencies in order to avoid
leakages of instability of foreign reserves between member countries.    The third regime of
transactions for reciprocal tourism appeared to be minor. According to the Arrangement,
private persons in both the Czech and Slovak Republics are allowed to exchange national
currencies directly for paying their tourist expenditures. Both Czech and Slovak financial
institutions can trade national currencies among themselves and with private persons at a
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revaluation and the other bank uses clearing devaluation maximally.6
floating rate determined by supply and demand.  However, financial institutions prefer to
follow the clearing rate  and to restrict  trading with national currencies in the case of
shortages since  holdings of national  inconvertible currencies deteriorate  the quality of
their portfolio.
Figure 2. Example of the clearing transaction
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Note: Suppose that the only transaction that took place was a payment by a Slovak importer
for Czech goods (worth 100 Czech crowns or 110 Slovak crowns - given the exchange rate) via his
account in the commercial bank. The clearing center of NBS  completed the operation by
announcing it to the center of CNB and by reducing the credit granted to the government. Hence
the payment entered the budget  of the Slovak government on the revenue side. Similarly, since the
payment was announced to the CNB clearing center, CNB made the payment to the exporter’s
commercial bank  and added it to the budget expenses. As a result, the Czech government budget is
in  deficit, and the Czech Republic became a clearing creditor.
As was said, the majority of transactions belong to the clearing regime. Using the
framework of the inter-bank clearing system, the Czech and Slovak central banks
established two clearing accounts guaranteed by  the governments. The mechanism uses a
monthly settlement period and allows for asymmetry in national payments up to 130 million7
ECU.  If this credit limit is exceeded by either member country, the difference has to be
settled in convertible currencies in one month. It implies that with permanent asymmetry in
payments, the republic budget of a creditor  is burdened with “non-standard” expenses of
130 million ECU to support the mechanism (See Figure 2).
During the two years of the Czech-Slovak clearing union’s existence, the amount of
standard transactions settled via the clearing mechanism was quite stable after the initial
increase during which economic  agents  accommodated the shock of currency dissolution.
On the contrary, the importance of the old account was falling as pre-split inter-republic
debts were paid  or fell  into the category of bad loans  (See Figure 3).

























































Note: While the Czech payments on the old account fell to zero after devaluation of the
Slovak crown, the Slovak payments on the old account decreased  more slowly due to relatively
longer lags in payments in Slovakia and   due to exchange-rate speculations. Standard payments
fluctuated on a non-falling trend signaling that the Czech-Slovak transactions did  not deteriorate
by the monetary disintegration.
Data source: Monetary Indicators (1993, 1994), CNB.8
The interesting feature of the clearing  payments was their  asymmetry. While in
1993 the Slovak Republic was a debtor country, in 1994 the Czech Republic started
exceeding its credit limit (See Figure 4).























































Note: The cumulative Slovak  deficit on the old account  increased each month  as the
Slovak payments  exceeded the Czech ones due to the favorable exchange rate of one to one. On the
contrary,   settlements of standard clearing payments resulted into the Czech cumulative deficit that
was accelerated in the middle of 1994 by Slovak trade barriers and financial transactions.  The
total cumulative deficit, obtained as a sum of standard and old-account deficits, exceeded the credit
limit of 4.6 billion Czech crowns (CZK) for the first time  in December on the Slovak side.  In the
second half of 1994 the asymmetry became  opposite and the Czech Republic started to be a
debtor. As a result, the Slovak Republic paid 2.8 billion CZK in 1993, and the Czech total  payment
was 12.2 billion CZK in 1994.
Data source: Monetary Indicators (1993, 1994), CNB.
In 1993, the Slovak deficit grew because of a  trade deficit as well as financial
transfers  originating from the assets-division process between the republics. Due to the
deficit on the Slovak balance of payments, the Slovak crown was devalued in July 1993, and
temporary trade barriers  were implemented in February 1994. Consequently, the Czech-9
Slovak trade balance started to work in the opposite direction. Moreover, the Czech clearing
deficit was enlarged by capital account  transactions as financial institutions started to some
extent allocating their resources within the payment clearing union  by considering interest
rate differentials.
Hence both republic budgets were burdened successively when guaranteeing the
clearing payments up to the  limit. Firstly,  the Czech budget surplus was reduced  from  6.6
to 1.1 billion  Czech crowns with clearing expenses and the  Slovak budget deficit was
lowered  from 28.5 to 23 billion   Slovak crowns in 1993.  Secondly, the Slovak  budget
deficit  increased  from 14.6 to 22 billion  Slovak crowns and the Czech budget surplus
grew  from 3.7 to 10.4 billion  Czech crowns in 1994.
The advantage of the payment clearing union, as defined by the Arrangement, is that
a gradual change toward a standard payment system is not  difficult. The following steps
remain to complete the process.  Firstly, the  abolishment of the old account is inevitable in
order to close the period of distinguishing between the old and new inter-republic
transactions by  unifying  two clearing exchange rates. Secondly, it is necessary to stop
using  clearing revaluation or devaluation since it is a non-standard policy tool and the
cross-exchange rate of crowns vis-a-vis the ECU is the “natural”   exchange rate.  Both steps
are important to eliminate room for speculations resulting from the multiple-exchange rate
that emerged mainly from the devaluation of the Slovak crown after which alternative
exchange rates started  diverging (See Figure 5).
Thirdly, the government involvement in the process is to be eliminated by  canceling
the credit limit and using unconditional regular  settlements.  As a result, the republic
budgets would not suffer from non-standard expenses or revenues, and reserves  in10
convertible currencies would accommodate asymmetries instead. Fourthly, since the Czech
crown was planned to become convertible according to the IMF definition, it is possible for
the Czech Republic to start  clearing  transactions  in domestic currency.


























































































Note: All exchange rates are defined as  prices of the Czech crown in terms of the Slovak
crown. The cross exchange rate is a ratio of two exchange rates vis-a-vis the ECU -
(CZK/ECU)/(SK/ECU)  - as reported by central banks. The clearing rate deviated from the cross
rate if one of the central banks  (or both) used clearing revaluation/devaluation in order to
equilibrate clearing payments. For example, in December 1993, there was a clearing devaluation
of the Slovak crown. The floating rate was taken from the exchange list   of the  Czech Savings Bank
- one of the biggest banks in the Czech Republic (rates quoted by other banks were similar). The
old-account rate was constantly one to one  as was fixed by the Arrangement.
Data source: Hospodáøské Noviny (Economic News), different issues (1993,1994).
  After accomplishing   the above-named steps, the Czech-Slovak monetary
disintegration will reach its target stage allowing  both members to conduct fully
independent monetary and exchange-rate policies.11
3. Costs And Benefits of Monetary Disintegration
According to the Monetary Arrangement from October 1992, the Czech and Slovak
Republics continued using the old Czechoslovak crown as a  common currency from
January 1993. The Monetary Council was formulating common monetary and exchange-rate
policies. Hence the initial position gives us a rationale to start our analysis of   monetary
disintegration using the cost-benefit  framework developed for currency unions. In order to
analyze monetary disintegration it  can be applied   in the  following way. Benefits of
currency union are understood as  potential costs of  monetary disintegration. The potential
costs  would become the real ones only if benefits are able to be realized given economic
and political constrains (without which  monetary disintegration is not likely to  take place).
For example,   common currency inherited from the previously common state  is  only
beneficial if it  is stable and credible.  Similarly,  costs imposed by   currency union are
understood as potential  benefits of  monetary disintegration.
According to the cost-benefit structure suggested in the studies analyzing monetary
integration2, countries going through monetary disintegration lose  common currency,
integrated financial market and to some extent economic    integration. Moreover, it is
necessary to define  exchange-rate system between two newly introduced currencies that is
costly in terms of information searching.  However, countries gain national sovereignty
since they need not  coordinate  monetary, fiscal  and exchange-rate policies closely. Also,
they benefit from  a new adjustment mechanism since the exchange-rate between newly12
established currencies is available. Benefits and costs are of  varying  importance in the
structure. On the one hand,  costs  of disintegration weigh more, the higher a degree of
interdependence among the union members was. Costs are lowered with  an unstable
common currency  not  supported by any supranational reserve institution, with an under-
developed financial market or with economic disintegration. On the other hand,  benefits of
disintegration  are increased with permanent asymmetries that are not reduced sufficiently,
either  by   some adjustment mechanism (labor and capital mobility,  nominal price and
income flexibility) or by an absorption mechanism such as a  federal fiscal transfer system.
Consequently, the independent policies are necessary for reaching both  external and
internal balances.
3.1. Weighing  Costs
The costs and benefits of the Czech-Slovak monetary disintegration were determined
by  several important factors: a long period of  common history, the burdens inherited from
a centrally planned system, the  transition towards market economies and the political
divergence as a result of the  1992 elections. Let us first weigh the costs  by answering the
following four questions. Did monetary disintegration induce the economic disintegration
and  how important was the mutual trade?  How costly was a loss of common currency? To
what extent did the monetary disintegration distort the Czech-Slovak  financial market?
What were the specific costs of applied intermediate stages of the monetary disintegration?
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Due to more than seventy years of  co-existence within  Czechoslovakia, economic
interdependence between the  two republics was  high. In 1992, Slovak exports to the Czech
Republic accounted for 46 percent of its total exports  and  Czech exports to Slovakia
accounted for 31 percent of total Czech exports.  Moreover, the  1992 statistics did not
record all  Czech-Slovak trade transactions because intra-firm transactions (Czech-Slovak
enterprises) were not often included. Since both republics were already burdened with
transitional recession, it was important  not to deepen it by any additional fall in outputs due
to a collapse in Czech-Slovak trade. As can be estimated from 1992 data,  a  30% fall in
Czech-Slovak trade would have caused, ceteris paribus,  a 4% fall in  Czech output  and an
8% fall in  Slovak output.
However, the efficiency of economic  integration was reduced by the fact that  both
economies had relatively large state sectors  which were  not developed with respect to  the
comparative advantages of each region. One implication that follows is that  the
interdependence was "artificial" in some respects since it was planned by the previous
regime. The gradual change in the  structure of trading partners of both republics that started
with the period of transition was likely to reduce the interdependence of the Czech and
Slovak Republics in the medium term because the share of trade with developed-market
economies was increasing due to higher efficiency.
The evolution   in Czech-Slovak trade in 1993 suggests that although there was a fall
in trade, it was not induced by monetary disintegration. In January 1993, there was a
coincidence in the timing of the currency union and tax reform. The introduction of VAT
reduced all types of transactions temporarily in both republics. Although two intermediate
stages of the monetary disintegration were implemented in 1993,  Czech-Slovak  trade14
recovered up to 75 percent of its 1992 level after the initial significant fall. There were two
main reasons for growing trend. First, as far as non-financial economic agents were
concerned, the model of Czech-Slovak transactions had not changed dramatically (they
continued using national  currencies to settle their transactions). Also, private commercial
banks used the clearing center in their domestic countries as if the partner bank was inside
their country. The two  central banks participated in  sharing the  increased transaction costs
significantly. Second, the clearing mechanism protected  member republics from restrictive
consequences of low foreign exchange reserves that stopped falling only in March 1993.
The reserves in convertible currencies were only used in order  to settle excesses in  the
credit limit. If   the monetary disintegration had been sudden   and convertible currencies
had been implemented as a medium of  transactions, the Czech-Slovak trade would have
been restricted by their shortage.  Especially in the first half of 1993, the amount of foreign
reserves was  relatively  low. In February, the monthly volume of clearing payments
accounted for  40 percent of Czech reserves (15 percent in May), and  for  60 percent of
Slovak reserves (260 percent in May). The Czech-Slovak experience showed that   with
carefully designed monetary disintegration it was possible not to accelerate a  fall in mutual
trade. Hence the  consequences of induced economic disintegration  did not exacerbate
costs of  monetary disintegration.
The essential  problem  of  monetary disintegration was a loss of the Czechoslovak
crown since it was characterized by high  credibility and both external and internal stability.
The Czechoslovak crown was not  devalued for three years, and the Czechoslovak central
bank  built foreign reserves remarkably. Prices were stable in the former Czechoslovakia,
the only big inflation sources were the 1990 price liberalization and the 1991 devaluation of15
the Czechoslovak crown. Consequently, it was clear that  loss   of such a  well-established
currency might be costly  because  the newly established currencies would   not necessarily
inherit  characteristics of  the original one. Interestingly,  both an improvement  as well as a
deterioration of internal and external stability of the currencies could be observed  after the
break up.
As the Czech-Slovak experience indicates,  the  external stability of the currency
was a decisive factor. It was eroded both by the political split itself as well as by one of its
consequences - the proclaimed shortness of the currency union. The transitional
Czechoslovak economy did not accommodate high enough reserves to protect its currency
for a longer period in order to overcome uncertainty. Due to   lost external stability, the costs
of monetary dissolution were not fully realized. It was clear that  maintaining the common
currency would have exhausted foreign reserves and subsequently would have led to either
exchange restrictions or  devaluation. Monetary disintegration itself did not generate  any
instability. In either republic, neither  internal nor external stability was  lost after the
monetary dissolution.  However, it was proved that  newly  established currencies  were of
asymmetric external characteristics. On the one hand, the Czech crown inherited fully
credibility  of the Czechoslovak crown.  Moreover,   its external stability  was improved by
capital inflows, and the Czech crown could  move further to  convertibility in 1995.  On the
other hand,  the internal stability of the Slovak crown was restored although the increasing
budget  deficit might have inflationary consequences. The Slovak crown was devalued by 10
percent and an import tariff was employed in order to overcome temporary  external
instability of the newly established currency.16
The  loss of a common currency increased transaction costs and uncertainty  for
economic agents in both republics.  However, transaction costs, as was said, burdened the
central banks mainly during the intermediate stages of disintegration. The Czech-Slovak
experience suggests that with two inconvertible currencies, banking sectors are not willing
to support “local convertibility” and accept costs of holding additional reserves. A clearing
mechanism with risk on the side of governments is a more realistic solution.  The design of
the Czech-Slovak monetary disintegration  lowered the costs of exchange-rate searching that
might strike  the private sector under other approach. Due to a common strategy of using
exchange rate as  nominal anchor, the original  exchange rate of one to one  changed
slowly.  Moreover,  the problem of  inter-republic debts (it  was not  clear in which currency
they  were denominated) was overcome  by the implementation of the old account into the
clearing mechanism. Specifically, two years after the political dissolution it was still
possible for economic agents to settle their  old debts by Slovak crowns as if they were
Czech crowns although the Slovak crown was devalued six months after the monetary
dissolution.
The third potential cost of the monetary disintegration is a distortion of common
financial market.  In the Czech-Slovak case,  the capital market was not  developed at the
time of monetary dissolution. The  first wave of voucher privatization  was organized within
Czechoslovakia and  residents could bid for shares from both republics without restrictions.
Trading  on independent stock exchanges in Prague and Bratislava  started in May 1993.
However,  residents were allowed to trade their shares on both Czech and Slovak markets
via the clearing mechanism. The second wave of voucher privatization was already
organized separately. Hence the possibility of a diversifying portfolio was restricted  for17
residents to their domestic republic only. It implies that monetary disintegration blocked
further developments of a common capital market  rather than  deteriorating it substantially.
As far as the money market is concerned, a broad  implementation of the clearing
mechanism to all types of transactions linked banking sectors in both republics protecting
them from a sudden disintegration.
In the end of this section, let us consider the specific costs of the Czech- Slovak
solution to monetary disintegration.  Due to  diverging exchange  rates,  speculations
became costly. It was possible to move the Czech-Slovak transaction to more a favorable
category. For example, the Slovak payments were channeled to the old account whenever it
was possible to avoid the Slovak crown’s devaluation. Also, the speculations within the
system were profitable3.  As a result,  imbalances in payments on the old and standard
accounts  deepened, and contributed to  losses of foreign reserves of central banks (when
settling an excess of the credit limit). Also, republic  budgets suffered from additional
expenses. It was not costly in 1993 when  the clearing mechanism was credited by the Czech
government  but it became costly in 1994 since the Slovak budget deficit was already high.
The analysis  implies that the main share of costs was borne by public sectors  although
diverging exchange rates gave rise to  a necessity for private banking sectors to monitor
carefully clearing transactions.
                                                
3 Suppose that  a Slovak firm paid 1 million Slovak  crowns to settle its old debt using the
old account, its Czech partner received 1 million  Czech crowns. In the second step, the Slovak firm
required reimbursement due to the incorrect settlement. The payment was returned through the
standard account with dirrerent exchange rate. Hence the Slovak firm received 1.1 million  Slovak
crowns. Net profit of this circle speculation was 100, 000 Slovak crowns.18
3.2. Weighing Benefits
Independent  monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies were the  main benefits of
monetary disintegration. While the monetary and exchange-rate policies were coordinated
closely within the currency union (and fiscal policy was limited by the Arrangement), the
second stage of monetary disintegration fully realized the benefit of independence.  This
section tries to show that due to   asymmetric problems as well as limited adjustment
mechanisms,  the benefits were substantial for both republics.  In addition, the clearing
mechanism provided a specific benefit in the form of  a temporary absorption mechanism.
The different nature of the Czech and Slovak  economies built during the previous
regime of a centrally planned economy was revealed during a transition period and
originated in different consequences for two economies. On the one hand, the Czech
economy was  more diversified, and it  proved more  adept at  absorbing shocks. On the
other hand, the  less diversified, less adaptable and more open economy of the Slovak
Republic was   more sensitive to the transitional problems and to external shocks (such as
the EC recession or the collapse of the former USSR). Specifically, before the political
dissolution,  the Slovak Republic    faced  a significant rise in unemployment, a greater fall
in output and  higher budget deficit than the Czech Republic. In 1992, the Czechoslovak
current account  was in surplus due to  revenues from tourism and services the significant
share of  which came from the Czech Republic. Also, the capital account exhibited surplus
and 90 percent of  private capital inflows were concentrated in the Czech Republic.
After the political dissolution, the asymmetry in performance  was enlarged  (See
Figure 6) by the collapse of the fiscal federal system and by the separation of the balance of
payments.19















Czech Republic 1993 20.8  3.5    6.6 3,800
1994 10.2  3.3  10.4 6,200
Slovak Republic 1993 23.2 14.4 -23    449
1994 13.4 14.8 -22.8 1,745
Note: *) Inflation is defined  in terms of consumer prices. The 1993 price jump was linked
to  the VAT tax reform in both countries.
        **)As reported, the  budget accounting  included both clearing expenses and revenues.
Data source: Monetary Indicators (1995), CNB. Annual Report (1994), NBS.
The fiscal federal system was an important tool through which  the Czech Republic
transferred  part of its revenues into the Slovak Republic.  The Czechoslovak State Bank
estimated these transfers to be from ten to fifteen billion crowns per year since 1948. In
1992, the estimated transfer was about  20  billion crowns. Moreover, the federal fiscal
system was not the only redistribute tool within the former Czechoslovakia.  Czechoslovak
financial institutions  were redistributing financial resources in order to balance the gap
between the level of  savings and the level of investment in Slovakia. Also, the
redistribution of profits within  Czech-Slovak enterprises was possible in the previous
regime.  It is worth noting that the Czech-Slovak trade  entered the Slovak balance of
payments as  an additional deficit entry and an absence of the capital inflow from the Czech
Republic increased the need for a capital inflow from the third countries significantly.
Hence common targeting of   internal and external balances was more difficult than within
Czechoslovakia.
With  closely coordinated  monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies, both
republics would have  relied on  adjustment mechanisms since the re-building of20
supranational institutions cushioning asymmetries would have been very difficult after the
split. However, the adjustment mechanism were not strong enough. A   housing problem (a
housing market was not developed  yet), traditions (during the previous regime people did
not change their jobs and  places of residence)   and structural unemployment problems (
skills of unemployed workers did not match requirements of available job openings and the
re-qualification program in Slovakia was not very successful) were causes of low labor
mobility. Higher competitiveness of production of depressed regions concentrated in
Slovakia could not be gained through the real depreciation of the Slovak crown because of
downwardly inflexible  nominal prices and wages.   Moreover,  capital mobility as the
possible strong adjustment mechanism supported divergent trends. When transfers from the
Czech Republic were  stopped, private foreign capital flowing mainly into  the  Czech
Republic could only enlarge differences. Consequently, it was unambiguous that  the
necessity of independent  policies would  increase in the medium term.
The gain of independence  was exploited first in the case  of  exchange-rate  policies
because the diverging performances of the balances of payments  called for different policy
responses urgently.  On the one hand, the Czech Republic begun building its foreign
reserves since the monetary dissolution. The large capital inflows improved the
convertibility of the Czech crown. On the other hand, the Slovak Republic devalued the
currency and imposed import tariff in order to ensure the external balance. Also, the fiscal
deficit run by the Slovak government would have not  been available under  the currency
union.
The clearing payment union, as applied in the Czech-Slovak case, provided the
member republics with an important  additional benefit. It cushioned  the losses of federal21
fiscal system, the integrated banking sectors  and supranational foreign-exchange  reserves.
In 1993, the Czech budgetary surplus was transformed into the  Slovak budget via the
clearing mechanism to a large extent. It functioned as the pro-export economic tool  because
the Czech government credited purchases of  Czech goods that might not be covered by
Slovak foreign exchange  reserves. In 1994, the Czech foreign exchange reserves were
transferred partially to Slovakia. The  financial transactions that were increasing the Czech
clearing deficit signaled that redistribution of free reserves  took place and cushioned  a
temporary lack of resources on the Slovak money market.
4. Conclusions
The cost analysis suggests that  the gradual monetary disintegration via the payment
clearing union did not generate all the potential   costs that could have been added to  those
imposed by the political dissolution.  The fast economic disintegration was not induced. The
increase in transaction costs was  borne by the public sectors to a considerable extent. A
credibility  of the new currencies was not lost during the process. However, the capital
markets were organized separately and the money markets were linked only partially. The
gradual approach allows  the Czech crown to start  functioning as a medium of Czech-
Slovak transactions because it might become convertible before the final stage of the
disintegration is applied.
The costs of  the disintegration were likely to be  higher if the process had been
designed without intermediate stages. The economic disintegration would have been
accelerated by a lack of reserves and the increased transaction costs. The problem of  the22
transactions denominated in the Czechoslovak crown (including the ownership of shares
from the first wave of voucher privatization)  would have had serious consequences for the
private sectors. With the slower disintegration, the  external stability of the common
currency could have deteriorated and the  foreign exchange  reserves exhausted fully.
Moreover,  credibility of the new currencies might have been lost.
The benefit analysis implies  that the political split sharpened asymmetry in
economic performances of the Czech and Slovak Republics. Adjustment mechanisms were
not strong enough to cushion those problems. Hence it was necessary either to respond with
economic policies  independently or to  re-build the  supranational institutions. The latter
possibility was not   feasible because of  the political split. Consequently, the main benefit
of monetary disintegration - a gain of   independent economic policies was important to both
republics.
The slower design of the monetary  disintegration would have required closer
coordination of monetary, exchange-rate and fiscal policies. Specifically, the  common
exchange-rate policy might  have   either exhausted  the foreign reserves in one country  or
required a devaluation unacceptable for the other country. Also, the  limited  fiscal deficit
might have been  costly. With faster disintegration,  the specific benefit of the clearing
mechanism that  cushioned the diverging trends  in deficits and reserves would not have
been available. In summary,  in the Czech-Slovak case,  the gradual monetary disintegration
was superior to  a single currency or a  sudden monetary disintegration.23
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